A Struggle On The Nile : The Background

January 11, 2010

This is the second post related to the previous one. The author discusses the Nile Basin treaties and dam developments on the Nile.

Read the post on Egyptian Chronicles blog

Struggle on The Nile: The Countries

January 11, 2010

I have found this post on another blog.  It contains background information on the Nile Basin countries.

Read the post

Hydropolitics in the Nile Basin

December 24, 2009

This is an article on Wikipedia.  I like it. If you think you can improve on it, please do so.

Read the article

Off the Record, World Water Crisis

November 24, 2009

Off the Record, World Water Crisis

By Alex Stonehill. The Common Language Project.

Water is the new oil.

I’ve spent the last four months reporting stories on water from Ethiopia and Kenya, two countries at the forefront of the world’s coming water crisis. And while western politicians and consumers fret over the declining economy and increasing oil prices, the news from East Africa is that with a growing majority of the world living on less than a dollar a day, the liquid that fuels bodies is becoming even more contentious than the liquid that fuels cars.

Our team uncovered distressing stories about people in the region facing water scarcity issues: women who walk for miles each day to collect drinking water; farmers pushed into deadly conflict with wildlife by dwindling river flows; city water supplies drained by overzealous irrigation. But the big picture that the smaller stories hint at is one of ecological disaster and conflict over resources that will affect millions and have repercussions around the world. As disturbing as it was to see the harsh realities of this crisis come in to focus before my eyes, equally upsetting was the realization that there is no journalistically viable way to write and publish that larger story.

Photo: Alex StonehillPhoto: Alex Stonehill


Africans’ struggles for water inevitably read to American audiences as happening “over there” in a chaotic and distant world. Connecting them to a looming global trend requires a prescience that doesn’t hold up to the exacting principles of print journalism. This is especially true because developments on the ground often outpace the scientific community — in many neglected areas, for example, the only way to find out if rainfall has been declining is to ask a subsistence farmer, because the formal scientific data simply doesn’t exist.

I’ve made the mistake in the past of being too timid to put something I felt strongly about in print because I didn’t have the sources or the clout to back it up. I can vouch for the fact that being able to say “I could have told you so, but I didn’t” after the fact doesn’t provide much satisfaction.

In fear of repeating the same frustrating experience again, and in faith that we can still mitigate this disaster, I’m offering the story behind the story on the coming world water crisis here. Off the record.

“As you may know, Alex, the coming World War Three will be fought over water, not oil.”

The director of a local water NGO told me this just a few days after I arrived in Ethiopia in January. Variations on that refrain were echoed by aid workers and researchers across the region over the next several months.

The fringes of Ethiopia’s fertile Highlands are dotted with camps housing refugees from water-based conflict in the rest of the country.

A few kilometers outside the ancient Muslim city of Harar, alongside a dry river bed, lies one such camp of 5,000 ethnic Somalis. They were driven from the Ogaden region by inter-clan conflict over access to water and pastureland. The camp is a sprawling expanse of small, wood-framed domes covered with a patchwork of plastic and other scrap material, the only material families could scavenge to shield themselves from the incessant beating of the equatorial sun.

These people lost all the livestock that were their livelihood, as well as many of their family members, to the conflict, and they now survive on the meat of cactuses and occasional handouts from the locals. In recent months that hospitality has begun to wear thin as well.

To get the water they need to drink and wash they dig into the sandy bottom of the dry riverbed until they’ve scratched deep enough to reveal the muddy water that flows beneath.

The elders of the village earnestly described their situation to me, asking hopefully if I knew anyone who could help, but even then I suspected that their story wouldn’t ever find its way into print. After all, the scale of their tragedy couldn’t compare to other African conflicts that are making the news, and there wasn’t any element of geopolitical intrigue here – just poor people fighting over water. I cursed myself for not thinking to at least bring a flat of bottled water when we came to visit the camp.

Damaged water pipes in Kibera slums. Photo Alex Stonehill


But taking a broader view, I later realized that the scale of this story is massive. Refugees from similar conflicts over access to shrinking water and pastureland are scattered across southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.

Pastoralists are especially vulnerable to climate change because they already live so close to the margins, dependant on grazing their cattle and camels in areas where agriculture isn’t viable. A small decrease in rainfall can be a death sentence for animals if sparse watering holes go dry. But most herders are already armed against predators, and will sooner clash with other groups to get access to water then stand by and watch their animals die.

The two main insurgencies currently beleaguering the Ethiopian government are devoted to the independence of Oromia and the Ogaden, both long-neglected lowland areas with large pastoralist populations. Neighboring Somalia, which for over fifteen years has been dismembered by inter-clan conflicts like the one that displaced the refugees we visited in Ethiopia, is an extension of the same arid lowland and is almost entirely populated by pastoralists as well. Even the genocides in Darfur and Rwanda were borne from the cultural collision between pastoralists and farmers in the same land.

There’s no denying that these are all politically motivated conflicts, but the role water scarcity plays in creating the preconditions of desperation and discontent is equally undeniable.
“Water is life”

This is another phrase repeated over and over again by East African aid workers. But a more revealing variation might be “water symbolizes wealth.”

Wherever there is poverty, water problems are paramount. Even in highland urban capitols like Addis Ababa and Nairobi, where temperatures are cool and rains are plentiful, access to clean drinking water and sanitation facilities tops the list of problems cited by slum dwellers, who make up half the population of some cities. Deaths from waterborne disease typically exceed those from AIDS , though water diseases usually receive less attention.

In Nairobi, city water infrastructure comes to a halt at the edge of Kibera, the continent’s second largest slum. An informal private sector of water vendors takes over from there, jerry-rigging a network of cheap plastic pipes and water tanks that allow the water to be tainted with free flowing sewage. The million people who live in Kibera typically end up paying hundreds of times more than those in other Nairobi neighborhoods for water that still makes them sick.

Slum residents, especially young men, are angry about this kind of government neglect. Tensions increase further when such neglect appears to exist along ethnic lines.

When slum residents riot, as they did following last December’s elections in Kenya, it is usually presented in the media as violence in a vacuum, or purely as ethnic strife. But it’s no coincidence that this kind of violence often breaks out in places where people lack access to basic services like water, and don‘t have many other options for getting the attention of their political leaders. When chaos erupted in Kibera in January, some of the first targets for vandalism were tanks owned by water vendors who had been price gouging the locals for years.
“Some of us will be alive to see it happen”

That’s what a Ugandan environmentalist told me about the nightmare prospect of the world’s second largest lake drying up completely.

Lake Victoria’s levels have receded by several meters in recent years, destroying the breeding grounds for fish, endangering the 30 million East Africans who live around the lake, and setting the stage for international conflict.

Fishing on Lake Victoria. Photo Alex Stonehill


Kenyan fishermen chasing fish into deeper Ugandan waters have been arrested and allegedly tortured by Ugandan military. Fisherman from the two countries have also clashed with each other directly.

In addition to rising temperatures, decreased rainfall, and watershed deforestation, scientists and fishermen alike blame new hydroelectric projects at the source of the River Nile in Uganda from draining too much water out of the rapidly shrinking lake.

Motivated by desperation or revenge, Kenyan fisherman in the shallows don’t hesitate to harvest baby fish, sealing the future fates of the fishermen from all three countries who share the lake.

Without international cooperation on plans for conservation, this sort of tit for tat race to exploit resources faster than your neighbor will ensure that Lake Victoria will end up like other devastated bodies of water like the Aral Sea and Lake Chad.

But international conflict over the water resources of the Lake Victoria/Nile River system seems almost inevitable. The nine countries that share the system (Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) are some of the world’s poorest nations and their populations are exploding, exponentially increasing stress on endangered water resources.

Just as Kenyan farmers are decreasing inflows into Lake Victoria by cutting forests in its watersheds, the Ugandan government is increasing outflows by running more water through its new dams into the Nile. Just as Ethiopians are pushing to industrialize their agricultural sector for export, putting new land under irrigation, hundreds of miles downriver, Egypt is channeling millions of gallons of water out of the river to “reclaim” vast swaths of desert.

While any one of these issues alone might get attention in the local, or even international press every once in awhile, the world seems to have averted its eyes from the combined threat to this massive ecosystem.

With the current regional population of 387 million on course to double in the next thirty years, the equation of available gallons of water from this system just doesn’t add up. Movements for international cooperation such as the Nile Basin Initiative have yielded some promising results, but in a corner of the world already fraught with tense rivalries, control over the most basic human resource is almost certain to be an impetus for violent conflict.

For Americans, environmentalism has traditionally been a misanthropic affair. We’re primarily concerned with preserving natural beauty for its own sake and protecting nature from the advances of civilization.

But in East Africa, itself home to an impressive environmental movement, environmentalism is inseparable from humanitarianism. Here, when ecosystems are destroyed, people are almost always directly harmed as well, even if they are the ones doing the destroying.

The experiences of Africans struggling to find fish in Lake Victoria or fighting over dwindling pastureland for their livestock in Ethiopia might not seem like particularly important stories for small-town American news audiences. But even ignoring the direct contribution Americans may be making to these distant problems in the form of climate change, these small stories are relevant to us for what they tell us about the big story that usually goes untold — the story of the entire planet as an ecological whole.

When violence over access to basic resources like water erupts among people who depend directly on the earth for their survival, it is an important reminder. Despite the distinctions we’ve imagined between the survival of the natural environment and our own prosperity, the health of the earth and the health of humans are one and the same.

Alex Stonehill is with the CLP whose mission is to develop and implement innovative multimedia approaches to international and local journalism.


Parallel courses to the Nile Basin Initiative for solving Nile disputes

November 24, 2009

It seems that the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) process will never resolve the dispute regarding the Nile water agreements. So what are the possible parallel lines of action open?

1. International Court of Justice

I have suggested before and here suggest again that the International Court of  Justice may be the place to settle this, at least as it comes to the legibility of the old Nile agreements. If any – or better all – of the Upper riparian countries take this to the court, with the aim of declaring the 1929 and 1959 are not binding to Upper Nile countries, progress will be made. I am not suggesting this as a substitute to the NBI process, but rather as a parallel course of action.

Here is some information from the International Court of Justice web site:

Who may submit cases to the Court?

Only States are eligible to appear before the Court in contentious cases. At present, this basically means the 192 United Nations Member States.

The Court has no jurisdiction to deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental organizations, corporations or any other private entity.  It cannot provide them with legal counselling or help them in their dealings with the authorities of any State whatever.

However, a State may take up the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which its national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter; the dispute then becomes one between States.

Why are some disputes between States not considered by the Court?

The Court can only hear a dispute when requested to do so by one or more States. It cannot deal with a dispute of its own motion. It is not permitted, under its Statute, to investigate and rule on acts of sovereign States as it chooses.

The States concerned must also have access to the Court and have accepted its jurisdiction, in other words they must consent to the Court’s considering the dispute in question. This is a fundamental principle governing the settlement of international disputes, States being sovereign and free to choose the methods of resolving their disputes.

A State may manifest its consent in three ways:

  • A special agreement: two or more States in a dispute on a specific issue may agree to submit it jointly to the Court and conclude an agreement for this purpose;
  • A clause in a treaty: over 300 treaties contain clauses (known as compromissory clauses) by which a State party undertakes in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court should a dispute arise on the interpretation or application of the treaty with another State party;
  • A unilateral declaration: the States parties to the Statute of the Court may opt to make a unilateral declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as binding with respect to any other State also accepting it as binding. This optional clause system, as it is called, has led to the creation of a group of  States each having given the Court jurisdiction to settle any dispute that might arise between them in future. In principle, any State in this group is entitled to bring one or more other States in the group before the Court. Declarations may contain reservations limiting their duration or excluding certain categories of dispute. They are deposited by States with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Are decisions of the Court binding?

Judgments delivered by the Court (or by one of its Chambers) in disputes between States are binding upon the parties concerned. Article 94 of the United Nations Charter lays down that “each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of [the Court] in any case to which it is a party”.

Judgments are final and without appeal. If either of the parties challenges their scope or meaning, it has the option to request an interpretation. In the event of the discovery of a fact hitherto unknown to the Court which might be a decisive factor, either party may apply for revision of the judgment.

As regards advisory opinions, it is usually for the United Nations organs and specialized agencies requesting them to give effect to them or not by whatever means are appropriate for them.

2. Ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses:

Meanwhile, the upper riparian countries should seriously consider ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). Not a single Nile Basin country ratified it

The objectives of the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses inter alia are to:

  • address the problems affecting many international watercourses resulting from, among other things, increasing demands and pollution,
  • create a framework convention that will ensure the utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and future generations
  • affirm the importance of international cooperation and good neighbourliness in this field
  • raise awareness of the special situation and needs of developing countries.

Following is its annex on Arbitration.



Article 1

Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of the present annex.

Article 2

The claimant party shall notify the respondent party that it is referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention. The notification shall state the subject matter of arbitration and include, in particular, the articles of the Convention, the interpretation or application of which are at issue. If the parties do not agree on the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the subject matter.

Article 3

  1. In disputes between two parties, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator and the two arbitrators so appointed shall designate by common agreement the third arbitrator, who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not be a national of one of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned, nor have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties or such riparian State, nor have dealt with the case in any other capacity.
  2. In disputes between more than two parties, parties in the same interest shall appoint one arbitrator jointly by agreement.
  3. Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment.

Article 4

  1. If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within two months of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the International Court of Justice shall, at the request of a party, designate the Chairman within a further two-month period.
  2. If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within two months of receipt of the request, the other party may inform the President of the International Court of Justice, who shall make the designation within a further two-month period.

Article 5

The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and international law.

Article 6

Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the parties, recommend essential interim measures of protection.

Article 8

  1. The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal and, in particular, using all means at their disposal, shall:  (a) Provide it with all relevant documents, information and facilities; and (b) Enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive their evidence.
  2. The parties and the arbitrators are under an obligation to protect the confidentiality of any information they receive in confidence during the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal.

Article 9

Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular circumstances of the case, the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its costs, and shall furnish a final statement thereof to the parties.

Article 10

Any party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the dispute which may be affected by the decision in the case, may intervene in the proceedings with the consent of the tribunal.

Article 11

The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute.

Article 12

Decisions both on procedure and substance of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of its members.

Article 13

If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or a failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before rendering its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is well founded in fact and law.

Article 14

  1. The tribunal shall render its final decision within five months of the date on which it is fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to extend the time limit for a period which should not exceed five more months.
  2. The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject matter of the dispute and shall state the reasons on which it is based. It shall contain the names of the members who have participated and the date of the final decision. Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting opinion to the final decision.
  3. The award shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. It shall be without appeal unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate procedure.
  4. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the final decision may be submitted by either party for decision to the arbitral tribunal whichrendered it.


Even if Egypt and Sudan do not abide by any of these or refuse to give consent, it makes their international position weaker.

Sharing benefits is no substitute for sharing water

November 24, 2009

Watching the news coverage of the drought on BBC, e.g. Ethiopia, leads me to believe that the trials to substitute sharing waters to sharing ‘benefits’ in the Nile Basin are likely to fail. Who of the upper riparian countries leaders would accept any ‘benefits’ in exchange of lives of not only live-stock, but also human lives?

Egypt must share the hardships that the upper riparian countries face when drought strikes. Egypt (or Sudan for that matter) cannot ask for a rigid quota of water regardless. I believe it will also help matters if the upper riparian countries would come up with percentage shares of water for all Nile countries.

The Scent of Money and the Stench of Corruption

November 24, 2009

The Scent of Money and the Stench of Corruption

(Lucas the Elder Cranach)

(Lucas the Elder Cranach)

When there is a chance to push a big loan out the door, some people just can’t say no. Every World Bank President since James Wolfensohn has committed to fight the cancer of corruption. For more than ten years, the Bank has talked the talk, but has not walked the walk. In April, an internal evaluation gave the institution the lowest possible grade for its anti-corruption efforts. As if to prove the point, the World Bank is now considering support for a multi-billion dollar project which squarely violates its procurement guideline and shows all red flags of corruption: the Gibe 3 Dam in Ethiopia.

With a price tag of $1.7 billion, Gibe 3 is the biggest dam and possibly the largest infrastructure project in Ethiopia’s history. According to scientists working in the region, the dam will push the fragile ecosystems of the Lower Omo Valley and Lake Turkana to the brink of collapse and undermine the livelihoods of 500,000 people. In July 2006 the Ethiopian power utility EEPCO awarded the contract for Gibe 3 to Salini Costruttori, an Italian construction company, without any competitive bidding.

According to Transparency International (TI), public works are the world’s most corrupt sector, with higher corruption risks than even oil and arms trade. No-bid contracts are an open invitation to bribery in this environment, and international competitive bidding is the most basic measure to curb corruption. “Open, public competition must be the rule and the actual practice for all procurement decisions above a relatively low value threshold; any exceptions should be possible only in truly exceptional circumstances (e.g. natural disasters)”, argues Michael Wiehen, a former World Bank director and board member of TI, in a paper on dams and corruption.

Ethiopia’s federal public procurement directive requires competitive bidding for large public work contracts. EEPCO argues that the directive allows for no-bid contracts in the case of unforeseen emergencies. This is certainly not the case for Gibe 3. In 2004, the utility already awarded a large contract for the Gibe 2 Dam to the same company without any competitive bidding. Salini had proposed Gibe 2 without as much as a feasibility study, and the project did not figure on EEPCO’s priority list. It has since suffered long construction delays.

Children playing by Lake Turkana (Alison M. Jones for www.nowater-nolife.org)

Children playing by Lake Turkana (Alison M. Jones for http://www.nowater-nolife.org)

The Gibe 3 Dam not only violates Ethiopian regulations, it also contradicts the procurement guidelines of multilateral development banks. The African Development Bank is currently considering support for the dam project. Friends of Lake Turkana, a group of affected people from Kenya, filed a request for investigating this breech of the procurement guidelines with the Bank’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Division in May 2009. Around the same time, an anonymous letter from inside the Bank warned International Rivers that opposition against the dam was useless since the project had been “greased by a few million dollars”.

The Italian export credit agency SACE has refused to lend support for the Gibe 3 Dam. Reason also seemed to keep the upper hand at the World Bank. In January 2009, a Bank manager informed the Bank Information Center: “The Government was also considering a request to the World Bank for its support for the Project. We have indicated to Government of Ethiopia that lending support to the project would not be possible, as the EPC contract has been awarded and the process did not follow the WB guidelines.”

Ethiopia has a low rating on Transparency International’s corruption index. Yet it is also one of the World Bank’s biggest clients in Africa, and has taken up 3 billion dollars in Bank support in the last four years. Have these friendly relations tempted the Bank’s management to look the other way? In an about-face, the Bank announced in its Monthly Operational Summary of June 2009 that it was considering an IDA credit of $50 million for the Gibe 3 Dam. When NGOs checked with the responsible Bank manager, he admitted that “at the request of the Government of Ethiopia for IDA support for the project, we have agreed to undertake due diligence to determine whether the Bank can be involved in the project or not. In this context, as we have noted before, we can possibly consider a guarantee to mobilize private capital for the project.”

The World Bank’s procurement guidelines are less strict for projects supported by guarantees than for loans and credits. The reason for this double standard is not clear, but this is a moot point. The Operational Summary states explicitly that the Bank is considering a credit for Gibe 3, for which open bidding is required. The Bank knows this has not happened. According to a recent update from a manager in its Africa Energy Group, the Bank still considers a credit “for environmental and social aspects of the project”.

The World Bank’s seal of approval would open the door for support from other lenders which have so far stayed away from the Gibe 3 Dam because of the project’s serious social and environmental impacts and corruption risks. Can the Bank ignore its own anti-bribery guideline so blatantly? Will its managers once again ignore the stench of corruption as they smell the sweet scent of money?

Photo credit for the homepage image: Alison M. Jones for www.nowater-nolife.org

Peter Bosshard is the policy director of International Rivers. His blog, Wet, Wild and Wonky, appears at www.internationalrivers.org/en/blog/peter-bosshard

Water, Wine, Vinegar, Blood: on Politics, Participation, Violence and conflict over the Hydrosocial Contract

November 24, 2009

Water, Wine, Vinegar, Blood: on Politics, Participation, Violence and conflict over the Hydrosocial Contract

Jeroen Warner, Wageningen University

While `water wars’ are not as rife as predicted in the 1990s, the world is currently facing a spate of conflicts over water, most famously the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia. The article argues to see them not as conflicts over the resource itself, but over the terms of engagement between state and society.

The emerging Hydro-Social Contract Theory (HMSC) can be helpful in describing such crises, usefully connects the interaction with society with the interaction with natural resources. It highlights the crossroads between conflictive and cooperative junctures in social relations.

In terms of the HSCT, recent conflicts over privatisation and infrastructural projects seem to highlight crises of the Lockeian contract. This article suggests that dissenting voices demand the serious consideration of a third type of hydrosocial contract – the Rousseauian hydrosocial contract.

Download the paperIMHO, this is a very important resource to activists and policy makers alike to understand the political science background of water conflicts.



Water, Wine, Vinegar, Blood: on Politics, Participation, Violence and conflict over the Hydrosocial Contract

August 31, 2007

A new resource has been shared in the resource section of

Development of an Effective Nile Basin Dialogue

Water, Wine, Vinegar, Blood: on Politics, Participation, Violence and conflict over the Hydrosocial Contract

By: Jeroen Warner, Wageningen University

While ‘water wars’ are not as rife as predicted in the 1990s, the world is currently facing a spate of conflicts over water, most famously the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia. The article argues to see them not as conflicts over the resource itself, but over the terms of engagement between state and society.

The emerging Hydro-Social Contract Theory (HMSC) can be helpful in describing such crises, usefully connects the interaction with society with the interaction with natural resources. It highlights the crossroads between conflictive and cooperative junctures in social relations. In terms of the HSCT, recent conflicts over privatisation and infrastructural projects seem to highlight crises of the Lockeian contract.

This article suggests that dissenting voices demand the serious consideration of a third type of hydrosocial contract – the Rousseauian hydrosocial contract.You are invited to view this new resource in our workspace, by using this link.


Water Hemogomy: Slides

August 31, 2007

A Framework for Analysis of Transboundary Water Conflicts
Mark Zeitoun, P.Eng, PhDLondon School of Economics and Political Science,
Centre for Environmental Policy and Governance


  • Current utilistation is ‘inequitable’ and ‘unreasonable’
  • Conflict exists, even if it is hidden

  • Intensity and outcome of conflict is determined in large part by power (not law or fair sharing)

  • The situation of hegemony may be obscuring our analysis as much as it prevents resolution of the conflict.

  • ‘Domination dressed up as cooperation’ (Selby)

Water Hemogomy – Slides